The twin results of ip rules: within- and between- patent competition in america pharmaceuticals industry
Contents
Frank R. Lichtenberg, Tomas J. Philipson
NBER Working Paper No. 9303
Issued in November 2002
NBER Program(s):The Care Program, The Financial aspects Program, The Productivity, Innovation, and Entrepreneurship Program
A patent only protects a pacesetter from others producing exactly the same product, but it doesn’t safeguard him from others producing better products under new patents. Therefore, you can divide in the supply of competition facing a pacesetter into within-patent competition, which ends from production of the identical product, and betweenpatent competition, which ends from manufacture of products on other patents. Previous theoretical and empirical micro -based analyses have emphasized the results of ip rules on within -patent competition by showing how protecting innovative returns from imitators raises R&D incentives. However, between-patent competition affects innovative returns, particularly through creative destruction within the many high-tech industries that appear central to overall economic progress. This means that the larger knowledge of IP-rules consider its effects on between-patent competition. We discover the total results of ip rules depend heavily on whether these untouched effects can be found. We try to estimate the relative magnitudes of these two causes of competition in restricting innovative returns within the U.S. pharmaceuticals market. Within this market within -patent competition from so-known as generic producers continues to be examined relatively more when compared with competition between-patents through so known as therapeutic competition. We estimate that between-patent competition, many of which occurs while a medication is under patent, costs the innovator a minimum of around within-patent competition, which cannot occur until a medication is off patent. The reduction in our discounted worth of the innovator’s return from between-patent competition seems to become a minimum of the size of the reduction from competition within -patents, and could considerably bigger.
| Frank R. Lichtenberg, Tomas J. Philipson
NBER Working Paper No. 9303 Issued in November 2002 NBER Program(s):The Care Program, The Financial aspects Program, The Productivity, Innovation, and Entrepreneurship Program A patent only protects a pacesetter from others producing exactly the same product, but it doesn’t safeguard him from others producing better products under new patents. Therefore, you can divide in the supply of competition facing a pacesetter into within-patent competition, which ends from production of the identical product, and betweenpatent competition, which ends from manufacture of products on other patents. Previous theoretical and empirical micro -based analyses have emphasized the results of ip rules on within -patent competition by showing how protecting innovative returns from imitators raises R&D incentives. However, between-patent competition affects innovative returns, particularly through creative destruction within the many high-tech industries that appear central to overall economic progress. This means that the larger knowledge of IP-rules consider its effects on between-patent competition. We discover the total results of ip rules depend heavily on whether these untouched effects can be found. We try to estimate the relative magnitudes of these two causes of competition in restricting innovative returns within the U.S. pharmaceuticals market. Within this market within -patent competition from so-known as generic producers continues to be examined relatively more when compared with competition between-patents through so known as therapeutic competition. We estimate that between-patent competition, many of which occurs while a medication is under patent, costs the innovator a minimum of around within-patent competition, which cannot occur until a medication is off patent. The reduction in our discounted worth of the innovator’s return from between-patent competition seems to become a minimum of the size of the reduction from competition within -patents, and could considerably bigger.
Machine-readable bibliographic record – MARC, RIS, BibTeX Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w9303 Printed: Litchenberg, Frank R. and Tomas Philipson. “The Dual Results of Ip Rules: Within- and Between-Patent Competition in america Pharmaceuticals Industry.” Journal of Law & Financial aspects 45 (2002): 643-672. citation thanks to Users who downloaded this paper also downloaded* these:
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Resourse: http://nber.org/papers/
